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Abstract: Exposure to chronic harm is difficult to manage and prevent in industry. There is a need to
better understand the state of mind when workers disregard safety processes and expose themselves
to this type of risk. This paper develops a theoretical model of the reason why workers voluntarily
expose themselves to occupational health and safety (OHS) hazards. This Risk, Agency, and Safety
& Health (RASH) model proposes that people willingly expose themselves to chronic injuries via
a series of risk-taking processes. This causal chain starts with personal motivation and over-alignment
with organisational purpose (including impression management). Ideally, that motivation would
be moderated by an ability to predict future harm consequences from the task at hand, but that
mechanism is weak because it is difficult to predict cause and effect, the consequences are too far
in the future, and the opportunities for vicarious learning are few. The motivation then causes
misdirected creativity, hence the development of personally novel ways of solving the problem,
albeit with greater risk of harm. Perverse agency then sustains actions that exposure the person to
harm. Original contributions are the provision of a detailed explanation for risk-taking, and the
integration of multiple well-established psychological constructs.
Keywords: manufacturing industry; occupational health and safety; agency; motivation; short cuts;
risk taking
1. Introduction
Industrial occupational health and safety has become increasingly important in the legislative
landscape of most countries. Existing methodologies for reducing harm are primarily based on the risk
methodology [1], namely the reduction of consequence or the likelihood of harm. This is evident in the
hazard assessment methodology and its deviations [2]. The general strategy has focused on avoiding
accidents by safety by design of technology, e.g., plant layout design [3], equipment design [4,5],
safety system design [6], maintenance design [7], and risk management [8]. Other accidents prevention
mechanisms are safety training [9] and signage [10,11]. The operator contributions to accidents are
included via human error considerations, such as the slip-lapse-mistake-violation categorisation [12].
Procedural failings are represented in bowtie analysis [13,14] and fault tree analysis [15]. However,
there is a deeper question as to the state of mind when workers disregard safety processes.
This paper develops a theoretical model of the reason why workers voluntarily expose themselves
to occupational health and safety (OHS) hazards. The area under examination in this paper is
occupational health and safety in the manufacturing industry. The concept of perverse agency is
introduced to explain how workers may self-motivate themselves to take risky short cuts.
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2. Background Literature
2.1. Occupational Health and Safety in Manufacturing Industry Work
The importance of OHS has changed during recent years, with an increased emphasis on the
responsibility of industry to avoid harm to workers. Historically the main focus has been on safety,
rather than the health aspect. Safety refers to a prevention of accidents that might immediately lead
to harm. In contrast, health refers to long-latency health issues, cumulative harm effects, or chronic
harm. The issue is that occupational harm cannot always be attributed to a single or definitive accident,
and does not always occur immediately after an event. Unlike an accident, this type of harm may take
time to become apparent. There may be delayed onset or persistent symptoms over extended periods.
Additionally, some health issues may occur by cumulative hazard exposure [16]. In contrast, the safety
perspective is more focused on the immediate harm consequences of accidents.
The World Health Organisation (WHO) describes occupational health and safety as:
‘Occupational health deals with all aspects of health and safety in the workplace and it has a strong
focus on the primary prevention of hazards. The health of the workers has several determinants,
including risk factors at the workplace leading to cancers, accidents, musculoskeletal diseases,
respiratory diseases, hearing loss, circulatory diseases, stress related disorders, and communicable
diseases, as well as others. Employment and working conditions in the formal or informal economy
embrace other important determinants, including working hours, salary, workplace policies concerning
maternity leave, health promotion, and protection provisions, etc.’ [17].
Some common OHS risks in the manufacturing industries are noise [18], cuts [19],
dust inhalation [20,21], chemical exposure [22], and repetitive activities [23,24], among others. Noise at
high levels is an example of an insidious health hazard because of the potential for workers to be
exposed over long durations. This can cause hearing loss, which can be permanent [25]. Most nations
are aware of this hazard and use enforcement, standards, and legislation to protect hearing loss [25].
All the same, the harm persists: WorkSafe New Zealand showed that there were more than 11,000 ear
injuries reported in 2014 and most of them were noise-related hearing loss [26].
2.2. Motivation
Returning to the WHO definition of OHS above, it is apparent that, in the conventional construct,
the causal factors are predominately external constraints of the workplace that are imposed on the
worker, and there is little explicit identification of motivations internal to the workers themselves.
However, motivation is an important factor in occupational health and safety.
Motivation is a psychological concept and it is used to describe the reason for one’s behavior.
Expectancy theory is a motivation theory developed by Victor H. Vroom in 1964 [27]. Expectancy theory
explains motivation as the combined effect of a chain of three factors: expectancy, instrumentality,
and valence [28]. This is typically expressed as:
Motivation = Expectancy × Instrumentality × Valence
Expectancy is the personal assessment that exertion of effort will result in performance.
Instrumentality represents the personal thinking of whether that performance will result in reward
or punishment. Valence describes the extent to which that reward or punishment is important to the
person. If the outcome of motivation is positive, it means that people are happy to do the job.
There are two types of rewards that are used in driving employee’s motivation: intrinsic and
extrinsic rewards [29]. Intrinsic rewards are psychological rewards, such as verbal rewards or
a sense of accomplishment [30,31]. Extrinsic rewards are rewards, such as money, bonuses, holidays,
and promotions [29]. Employers select rewards to deliberate drive motivation. This is a widely
researched area in the business motivation literature, where the objective is to better understand the
relationship between rewards and performance, e.g., [32]. Many industries using this method to drive
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employee’s motivation and increase productivity [33], participation [34], and quality of work [35].
However, the same motivational methods may cause workers to over-align with organisational
purpose, and they result in stress and fatigue, and hence, increase their risk of harm. Therefore,
psychosocial factors are also important at work [36].
2.3. Mental Health and Motivation
Mental health is another considerable issue for industry. It is described as the ‘psychological
state of someone who is functioning at a satisfactory level of emotional and behavioral
adjustment’ [37]. Mental health problems have negative effects on individual motivation, with real
economic consequences, such as decreased productivity. Contributory factors include time pressure,
job satisfaction, and workload [38]. Modern legislative frameworks explicitly assign to industry the
duty to protect both physical and mental health, e.g., [39], but the safety frameworks are asymmetrically
focused on the former.
Existing research in mental health in the context of safety is focused on mental workload [40],
effects between mental capacity and work ability [41], loss of concentration and difficulty in
cooperating [42], physical behavior outcomes [43], and links to accidents [44,45]. There is a strong
relationship between mental health and individual’s motivation [46,47].
Additionally, mental health affects motivation. In turn, motivation affects people’s decision
making [48]. The present paper focuses on motivation, and how it affects workers’ approaches to
safety. Mental health is not explicitly included here, except as a possible precursor to motivation.
2.4. Causes of Voluntary Exposure to Risk
Lack of OHS knowledge can increase the likelihood of exposure. Some workers do not clearly
understand the risks in a task, and they cannot anticipate the hazard beforehand. Therefore, it is
usually too late for them to devise a treatment or precaution when they notice the harm occurring [49].
Workers with a high OHS awareness are likely to pay more attention to their health and safety, and this
makes them more careful at work than other people [50].
Secondly, some experienced workers have a good understanding of the occupation health and
safety, but they still accept work with risks and they tacitly consent to unknown safety hazards. Survey
results show that 90% of workers are not afraid to meet challenges at work, even though they know
that it will be an unsafe environment or unsafe work practices [50]. It is apparent that workers are
willing or inadvertently take short cuts in their health and safety.
Thirdly, management and organisational culture can affect OHS hazard exposure [51]. The reason
for an organisation existing is to make a profit, and this has a strong connection to production
targets in manufacturing industries. Organisations have to meet their productivity targets, thus they
provide incentives for workers to align with economic objectives. The common methods using
in labor-productivity improvement are overtime work, and imposing pressure on workers [52].
Consequently, workers have to sacrifice their rest time or increase their productivity, which makes
them feel tired, unbalanced, and stressed [53]. Providing rewards is one of the treatments to drive
workers’ motivation [54,55]. However, it still increases the risk of OHS hazards at work [53]. Therefore,
it is easy to make changes in workers’ motivation, but this can also leave them feeling anxious or upset.
Poor managerial ethics also has a negative effect on safety and accidents prevention [56]. This may
be because some managers cannot identify the OHS problem clearly, simply tell their employees
that they are working within a safe situation, and prevent them from questioning the organisation’s
decisions [57]. Furthermore, organisational culture plays an important role in workers’ attitude [58].
This is because of group mentality. This causes a person to behave in a way that is based on others’
performance rather than their own [59]. It operates via psychology mechanisms of peer pressure
and vicarious learning. Cultures that emphasise manly behavior may, for example, cause workers to
avoid wearing ear protection if they feel that it makes them look soft. It is difficult to make changes in
workers’ perceptions and attitudes about standard safety practices [60].
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2.5. Contemporary Issues in Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) Research
There are many ongoing issues with OHS as applied to industrial work. Firstly, the literature
identifies only a few methodologies to optimize health and safety. Most of the research is focused
on risk reduction and a limited range of interventions (for example, educating workers and personal
protective equipment (PPE)). Secondly, health and safety (H&S) legislation in many countries requires
employers to minimize occupational health loss, e.g., [40], however the long latency of these injuries
makes it difficult to detect the damage as it occurs. Additionally, it is difficult to determine which past
work period contributed to the harm, and as a result, it is difficult to prevent. Thirdly, there is only
limited understanding of the causality for occupational health issues. Workers typically undertake
many different activities in manufacturing plants, so it is difficult to attribute harm to a specific cause.
Furthermore, it is also difficult to understand why people make short cut actions in health and safety.
Finally, most of the attention relating to risk assessment is applied to the safety and the prevention of
accidents that lead to immediate harm, with less on health issues, especially on the long-term health.
A related problem is that the definitions and methods in monitoring health risks are limited.
3. Methods
3.1. Purpose
The purpose of this research was to develop a model to explain the causality whereby people take
short cuts in personal occupational health and safety. We wished to understand the human factors and
the flow of conscious and subconscious decision making that affect hazards exposure.
3.2. Methodology
A qualitative methodology was applied to develop the model. We started by examining
the literature for relevant constructs in the occupational health and safety literature. We then
developed an initial model that sought to describe how workers’ motivation affects their actions.
This was presented to the annual general meeting of the New Zealand Society of Safety Engineering
(‘Occupational health in an industrial context—Overview of UC research project’, 25 January 2017,
IPENZ, 50 Customhouse Quay, Wellington, New Zealand) and discussed by a group of eight
professional engineers with expertise in safety engineering. They provided a critique of the model,
identifying areas that were well represented and also those that were under represented. From this
early work arose the idea of perverse agency (described below). These discussions were used by the
authors to further refine the model.
Subsequently, there was an individual discussion with an engineer from a construction firm, and
this resulted in further refinements. We then examined the Pike River Mine disaster [61], from which we
extracted additional principles of how incentivisation could affect workers motivation towards unsafe
acts. From this arose an element in the model relating to over-aligned with organisational purpose.
The next stage in the development of the model was the adoption of several constructs from
psychology and organizational behavior, e.g., personality, dark triad, and motivation theory. Doing this
grounds the model in the wider literature. The psychological constructs themselves are not critically
evaluated here; rather, it is the integration of them into a wider model that is new. Consequently,
the constructs are defined at first usage in the results, rather than being described in the literature
review above.
Moving to completion, we then developed the model to explain why workers might appear to
willingly forgo their own safety to complete a task. Throughout the development, we applied a system
engineering methodology. Specifically, we represented the ideas as a flowchart with proposed causal
mechanisms, and we continuously revised it to ensure coherence in what was being represented.
We anticipated what cognitive mechanisms might be involved, and where they might be positioned in
the flow of decision-making.
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4. Results: Risk, Agency, and Safety & Health (RASH) Model
4.1. Overview Model
We propose that workers approach H&S decisions in a sequential manner, starting with
an evaluation of the task at hand. They then apply their personal agency to execute the task, and an H&S
outcome emerges. This simple linear model is shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Risk, Agency, and Safety & ealth (RAS ) odel.
However, the process is complicated in several ways. Firstly, there are situational variables
in the form of OHS standards and standard operating procedure that will affect the worker’s
decision. Secondly, there are management and organisational culture variables that will shape the
response. Thirdly, there is learning that occurs: people gain experience and this influences their future
decision making. The result of this process is that agency is applied in positive or negative ways.
Later, we propose that the antecedents for perverse agency primarily occur early in the process, at the
stage, when the worker is evaluating the risky task.
We term this the RASH (Risk, Agency, and Safety & Health) model as it encompasses these
various effects. Additionally, it proposes mechanisms whereby workers make imprudent decisions,
hence perverse agency.
The following sections elaborate on this concept by progressively detailing each process.
4.2. Process 1: Worker Evaluates Risky Task
We propose that workers take a pragmatic approach to their initial evaluation of risks within the
task at hand. Specifically, we propose the existence of two key factors in the decision-making. The first
dimension is the perceived task novelty, wherein the task is evaluated for the degree to which it is
well-defined or novel. The second is the perceived residual risk, which is the worker’s evaluation
of the extent to which existing treatments are effective at preventing the risk. We propose that these
factors interact in the following manner.
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4.2.1. A: Low Task Novelty—Low Residual Risk
For a safety system that is within control, i.e., functioning effectively, the task is routine (has been
standardised) and the existing treatments (e.g., procedures, PPE) are effective. Therefore, the worker is
not exposed to unreasonable risk.
4.2.2. B: Low Task Novelty—High Residual Risk
In situations where the safety system has inadequately assessed the risks, the treatment might
be ineffective, even for routine tasks. This arises because the organisation or the worker has not
validated that the treatment is indeed effective. Thus, a larger residual risk is presented to the worker
than expected. The worker undertakes the task naively and this results in inadvertent exposure to
known hazards. It is worth noting that, in terms of legislation, it is the duty of the organisation and its
executives, not primarily the worker, to validate that the treatments are effective.
4.2.3. C: High Task Novelty—High Residual Risk
Another situation is where the tasks are perceived to be novel, and the worker correctly identifies
that the existing treatment does not fully control the threat. Thus, there is a known and significant
residual risk. The work requires additional safety precautions and treatments to deal with the new
risk. At this point, the worker has a choice: to refrain from doing the task, or to proceed with personal
acceptance of the risk. The latter choice results in conscious exposure to the hazards.
4.2.4. D: High Task Novelty-Low Residual Risk
The fourth situation is that the worker correctly perceives the task to be novel, but it fails to
recognise the new risks therein. We anticipate that this situation arises from a lack of situational
awareness, ineffective hazard assessment, poor training, or failure to anticipate cause and effect.
Thus, the worker fails to perceive the new hazards in the situation, and persists with work procedures
that are inefficient proof against those hazards. This results in ignorant exposure to new hazards.
The ideal organisational practice is that the resulting near-accidents will be reported, and will result in
the eventual re-assessment of the hazards in the situation and better future protection.
This proposed causality is summarized in Figure 2. The diagram represents the branches of
decision-making made by the worker in the various situations. It also shows the proposed causal
mechanisms (arrows entering under the actions) and the constraints on those actions (arrows entering
above). The numbers in circles represent call-outs to locations in other diagrams.
We also propose a further simplified model, which is one that ignores the causality and simply
represents the outcomes as a function of the inputs. For this model, we assume that the two input
dimensions are orthogonal, resulting in a 2 × 2 matrix of outputs, see Figure 3.
It is evident that significant numbers of people do make the choice for conscious exposure to the
hazards (output C). In the next part of the model, we speculate on the motivations for this behavior,
and we introduce the term ‘perverse agency’ to describe it.
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4.3. Process 2: Motivation Arises towards the Task
We propose that motivation arises before workers make any H&S short cuts, see Figure 4.
Specifically, we propose as a first approximation that intrinsic and extrinsic motivation operate
somewhat independently of each other. The intrinsic factors are internal personal choices, whereas the
extrinsic factors arise in the organisational environment that surrounds the worker. However, we also
propose that the separation is not absolute, and we identify pathways whereby these factors mutually
affect each other.
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4.4. Intrinsic Motivation
Intrinsic motivation (IM) refers to internal or personal motivations that can affect one’s
behavior [32]. In this model, IM affects work attitude and personal valance (attitudes towards
reward and punishment). We propose that there are five main characteristics within IM. These are:
A: Personality (especially Conscientiousness), B: Personal Worldview, C: Self-efficacy, and D: Dark Triad.
We propose that th re are four main routes that can affect intrinsic motiv ti and result in personal
choice in safety behaviors, as per the explanation below and the representation in Figure 5.
4.4.1. A: Personality
Perso al y refers to enduring individual styl s of be av or. This affects how people respond or
behave in situations, an it can effect performance [62]. The five factor model (FFM), also k own as
the Big 5, is the dominan descr ption of perso ality [63]. The fa tors are Openness, Conscientiousn ss,
Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism (OCEAN). Of these factors, we propose that
conscientious is the key characteristic in the safety situation, and we suggest it contributes to a positive
work ethic. Conscientiousness refers to a cluster of attributes that include carefulness, hard-working,
vigilance, reliability, dependability. Generally, conscientious people are self-disciplined, and prefer
planning rather than spontaneous behavior. We also propose that conscientious people are more
likely to accept a task with unknown risk, because their internal sense of responsibility can affect
one’s agency and then can be over-aligned with the organisational purpose, see following Section 4.7,
Process 4. This is consistent with the literature, where conscientiousness is specifically associated
with health and safety attitudes [64] and workplace performance [55,65]. The five-factor model of
personality was deliberately designed to avoid pejorative meanings. Consequently, the extremes of
all its scales are intended to be non-condemnatory. The behaviours it describes are neither good nor
bad—instead, they are merely styles of interaction. However, the reality is that people do behave in
selfish ways, and this needs to be included.
4.4.2. B: Personal Worldview
Personal worldview is another attribute that effects the worker’s motivation towards safety.
A worldview is the totality of a person’s perspective on the world and the values that they seek to
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embody in their own life. Belief systems are the mental constructs that individuals and groups create to
make sense of themselves and their spiritual place in the world. They provide an existential postulate.
They are based on faith–not necessarily religious. The world view is coherent to the person who holds
it—its makes sense to them. It is also strongly held, in that people will not easily change their view.
Individuals within a culture share elements of the same world view.
No amount of information will change a worldview. They are deep seated beliefs that are linked
to personal identity. Conflict can arise between people with different world views. The conflict is
about the values. Personal value system is structured by one’s world view; and, it tells a person what
is good, important, and desirable. Consequently, in the safety situation, it provides a mechanism that
creates an intrinsic perception of right vs. wrong regarding safety, see Figure 5 and route B1 therein.
Furthermore, we propose a second route whereby personal worldview affects attitudes towards
safety. This is via the value systems of the worldview affecting the valence; therefore, the extent to
which a particular outcome has value to the individual, see Figure 5 and route B2 therein.
It is expected that these personal values will be affected by upbringing, environment, ethnicity,
culture, etc. This is consistent with others in the literature who have proposed that personal value
systems play an important factor in personal behavior for health and safety [66]. There are many
situations in societies where these personal worldviews cause people to accept significantly higher
safety risks than usual, a common example being war. The effect is also evident in industry, and results
in workers making personal sacrifices to improve the organisational outcomes, examples being
a Chinese oil drilling worker called Wang Jinxi who achieved hero status by jumping into the mud pool
of an oil drilling well to stir the mud with his body, and hence, keep the well operating. This example
of positive work attitude continues to affect and reinforce the Chinese value system and worldview
about work ethic. Consequently, we propose that worldview affects the personal assumption or the
avoidance of risk.
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4.4.3. C: Self-Efficacy
Self-efficacy is the confidence in one's own ability to achieve intended results [67]. As such,
it refers to a personal approach towards problem-solving and persistence at a difficult problem, rather
than merely self-confidence (which may be potentially misplaced). It has a positive effect on expectancy,
general decision making [68], and work engagement [69]. The attribute is also associated with internal
locus of control. Self-efficacy is believed to be developed by personal experiences and the external
social factors that accompany them (such as encouragement and social learning) [66]. The role of
self-efficacy on safety has been noted in the literature, and has, for example, been found to correlate
with safety behaviours of pilots [70] and medical doctors [71]. There is also evidence that the locus
of control is associated with safety behaviours for truck drivers [72]. It has been shown self-efficacy
regarding safety in a steel plant is associated with several organisational factors relating to team
communication and supervision [73]. It is also possible that workers take risks as part of impression
management—as part of a need to present themselves positively to others, and hence undertake
risk-taking activities. We propose that self-efficacy affects motivation directly via the expectancy route.
4.4.4. D: Dark Triad
In the present model, the selfish attributes are included using the Dark Triad of personality.
The attributes are: Machiavellianism, Narcissism, and Psychopathy [74]. These represent different
aspects of malevolent selfishness, and they are all associated with manipulative actions to further
their own advantage at the expense of others. Machiavellianism represents manipulation, conscious
deception of others, and lowered ethics. Narcissism is characterized by egotism and “excessive love
for one’s self, feelings of superiority, attention seeking, and exploitativeness in relationships with
others” [75]. Psychopathy refers to callous behavior towards others, and can include impulsivity and
low remorse [75]. The Dark Triad has previously been applied primarily in the psychology literature,
and it is used to explain situations, such as bullying [76] and aggression [77]. Also, the attribute of
sensation seeking, which might be considered as another aspect of narcissism, has been associated with
risk-taking in skateboarding [78]. The general concept of the Dark Triad has not previously been applied
to safety considerations. We proposed that personal dark triad can have an effect on instrumentality.
This is because people may balance the rewards and punishment before making an action. Specifically,
we propose that the Narcissism factor increases the Instrumentality of the motivation (pathway D1 in
Figure 5). Also, that the Machiavellianism factor affects ethical considerations, as elaborated below
(see pathway D2, Figure 5).
4.4.5. E: Ethical Considerations
Ethical considerations are the moral constraints that organisations set on the behavior of
their members. Ethics may exist independently on any personal worldview or religious belief.
Ethics internally limits a person to avoid actions that would cause harm to others at work. It provides
a judgement mechanism that constrains decision-making in order to preserve the well-being of
people. We propose that it primarily acts in the interests of others, and it has a weaker effect
regarding self. Consequently, it acts contrary to the selfish decision-making priorities of the dark triad.
The intersection of ethics with H&S is a developing area within the literature [79]. Codes of ethics
for the engineering profession often include a duty of care for the H&S of others [80]. Likewise for
other professions. Organisations, especially government departments, may have codes of conduct for
their staff, although this is not universal. However, workers are not usually covered by codes of ethics.
Consequently, workers may not be subject to an explicit ethical code, though they do still have their own
personal moral considerations. These may be based on their culture, religion, and worldviews. In the
present model, we propose that ethical considerations include the self-assessment of the legitimacy of
behaviours towards others, and hence moderate the Machiavellianism.
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4.5. Extrinsic Motivation
Extrinsic Motivation, defined as the motivation that effected by external factors that arise outside
of the individual. Extrinsic Motivation is virtually opposite to Intrinsic Motivation. In this context
extrinsic motivation (EM) refers to the external factors that are caused by the work environment.
These arise outside of the individual, though they interact with and recruit aspects of intrinsic
motivation. We propose the following model of how organisations affect the motivation of workers,
see text below and Figure 6.
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4.5.1. A: Organisational Reward and Incentives
Organisations exist to fulfil a purpose, and executives and managers make decisions that advance
that purpose. The mechanisms used are strategic human resources management, and incentivisation
of productivity. These can be affected by external rewards, such as remuneration, extra vacation,
and promoti n. These rewards confer value to the worker, including social status within
the organisation.
4.5.2. B: Worker Evaluates Personal Benefit to Achieving the Objectives
Giv n a Task ith its perceived risk (opportunity and threat) implications, the worker consid rs
the personal rewards that the organi ation is offering for completing the task, nd evaluates the
valance thereof. There ore, the in rinsic and extrinsic motivational factors intersect at this s age.
This, we propose, is the first factor that determines the extent to which the work ali ns with the
organisational purpose. Over alignment occurs when the worker seeks to meet organisational purpose
at the expense of safety and other considerations.
4.5.3. C: Development of Workplace Culture and Group Mentality
Workplace culture and group mentality affects peoples’ behavior generally [81,82], and it is known
to affect their attitudes towards safety in particular [83,84]. This may occur via peer group pressure [64].
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Recent research has identified that the creation of a safety-oriented culture requires training [85],
systematic organizational processes [86], commitment from management [87], responsiveness to new
conditions [88], and national efforts [89]. However, safety culture is difficult to define [90], difficult
to measure [91,92], and the relationships between safety climate and safety behavior are not straight
forward [93,94].
We propose that group mentality and other developments of workplace culture may have effects
on what the organisation implicitly expects to be done, especially its organisational targets. A positive
safety culture is proposed to be one that generates belief in workers that accidents are preventable
if personal agency is applied. This is related to the concept of causal attribution [95], which in turn,
is related to error disclosure [96].
We propose that safety culture is created and demonstrated by management, and is transmitted
to workers by vicarious learning (observing how the organization actually behaved in the past).
A psychosocial factor is anticipated whereby work related stress forces the individual into an expected
performance. Self-imposed expectations of conformal behavior are proposed to contribute to
a collective culture, even if that culture is not explicitly articulated. There can also be explicit
organisational constraints on behavior (e.g., codes of conduct, ethics). Consequently, the workplace
culture provides tacit expectations of which organisational outcomes will be prioritised.
4.5.4. D: Worker Determines What the Organisation Expects to Be Done
Workers are presented with a task for which they have a perceived risk. We propose that they
determine their personal course of action by balancing tow considerations: the explicit workplace
safety procedures (e.g., the need to wear PPE), and the tacit expectations organisational priorities
via the organisational culture. In a negative situation this may involve the worker determining
that the organisation values productivity more than say safety, even if it has explicit safety systems.
In a positive situation, the worker would value safety as an equal priority to productivity, and this
might mean doing the task slower (hence, lower productivity) to preserve the safety priority. It is
not only the presence of safety protocols and provision of PPE that is important—there also needs to
be a culture that prioritises safety equally [97] with other organizational objectives [98], rather than
relegating safety to a secondary consideration. Organisations need to consciously work on developing
positive safety culture [99] (see also above). Safety nudges may also be useful [100], although this is
a developing field.
4.5.5. E: Alignment Decisions
Finally, we propose that the worker make a cognitive calculation that combines the perceived
personal benefits (B) and the expectations of what action is expected from the organization (D).
This calculation may not even be conscious or explicit. The adverse outcome that potentially arises is
one of over alignment, where the worker seeks to meet organizational purpose at the expense of safety
and other considerations.
4.6. Process 3: Workers Determine Approach
We propose that after evaluating the risk in a task (process 1), workers determine their approach
to the task. This is primarily a decision process, hence one of personal judgement. The decision may
be made consciously or subconsciously. Two main outcomes are anticipated: A decision to apply
standard procedures, or to take short cuts. The latter are violations: Creative but unsafe innovations
for performing the work. The proposed inner workings of this decision are shown in Figure 7 and are
described below.
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4.6.1. Personal Judgement
First, we propose that personal judgement is a key factor. In this context, we propose that
judgement refers to the ability to identify the multiple alternative solution paths that might exist,
the ability to select between these paths based on the benefits and detriments of each in the situation,
and the ability to explain and justify their choice. Part of judgement is therefore the ability to adapt to
different situations, and to recognize that certain solutions have the potential for adverse outcomes
in specific situations. People lack judgement if they fixate on one solution path, irrespective of its
appropriateness in the situation.
4.6.2. Resource Determination
As a consequence of the application of judgment, the worker makes a decision and this commits
them to a subsequent process of evaluating whether their course of action is sufficiently provided with
procedures and resources.
A: Sufficient standard procedur s and resources
In this situation, we propose that the current standard proc dures and esource can be trusted
and th worker believes that they are functioning effectively. Therefore, the worker commits to apply
these existed working methods to complete the task.
B: I sufficient sta dard procedures and resources
In this situation the worker deems there are insufficient standard procedures and resources.
Then, the worker may apply those procedures anyway and hope for a favourable outcome.
Alternatively, the worker may apply creativity to devise new ways of accomplishing the task.
We propose that this occurs when there is personal motivation towards completing/avoiding the task,
or the procedures are deemed to be insufficient, or they have previously been shown to be ineffective.
Importantly, the outcome may be safe or unsafe.
4.7. Process 4: Perverse Agency
Bandura’s theory of self-efficacy describes a person’s belief in their ability to achieve goals [101,
102]. Agency, per Bandura’s concept [103,104], is that people commit their effort in a deliberate way
to achieve goals that they have anticipated and have confidence in their ability to succeed. This has
developed into a broader construct, which is referred to as sense of agency, personal agency, or human
agency. It may also be related to Vroom’s Expectancy theory [27]. For example, expectancy has been
theorized to have a direct effect on self-efficacy judgments [105].
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Personal agency is a positive feature of human tenacity [106], but we propose that it has the
potential to be recruited to perverse outcomes, i.e., the sense of commitment may be directed towards
doing an action that is unwise. This contrasts with the literature, wherein agency is seen as a positive
attribute. We do not deny the positive aspects of agency, but propose that it can be directed negatively
towards the completion of acts that should not have been done, hence perverse agency. We define
it thus:
Perverse agency is application of poor judgement whereby the protagonist persists
(by showing decisiveness, action, and commitment) with an unwise course of action and
willing assumption (personal acceptance) of risk that others would consider unreasonable,
to achieve what they feel is a good objective.
This idea is potentially applicable to many different areas of human decision-making. In the safety
context, we propose that process involves the following contributory activities, as described below
and represented in Figure 8.
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Firstly, a w rker has a personal motivation towards compl ting (or avoiding) a task (s e Intrinsic
motivation above). Included here is the sense tha the objectives are worthwhile to achieve. This is
followed by a willing a sumption of risk, which in turn, is informed by the rior judgement of the risk
inherent in the task (see Process 1 above). Unsafe actions ar therefore proposed to be reced by
errors in judgement, wherein either the objectives are over-valued, or the threats are under-appreciated.
The next stage is the commitment of personal agency to attempt to achieve the outcomes decided
in the previous stage. Personality is proposed to be involved in perverse agency, via the conscientious
personality characteristic [63]. Conscientious workers are reliable, and they desire to complete a task
well. They also wish to persistence in a course of action until they finish the job. They may be more
loyalty to their employers or organisation. These characteristics make conscientious workers not afraid
to accept challenges at work. In the case of hazards, they may prioritise work accomplishment rather
than safety, or even consciously take actions that are personally hazardous for themselves for the sake
of completing the work.
This recruits a continuation of agency in that the worker persists with the course of action despite
disconfirmatory evidence, i.e., evidence suggesting this is not a good idea, or the occurrence of minor
personal harm. There may also be an element of misapplied creativity and innovation, in which the
worker finds an unsafe but expedient solution (see Process 3). Furthermore, we propose that workers
may be inaccurate judging their ability, i.e., their self-efficacy may be unreasonably inflated. This may
be ecause of their exce sive expectancy in the outcomes [107].
The e d result is that the worker commits to applying a short cut or viola ion. This is related to,
but not identi al to assumption of risk (risk-taking). With the assumption of risk, the wor r accepts
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a known risk [108], but in the more generalized situation of perverse agency the worker does not
necessarily consciously think about the risk, neither the long term consequence nor the likelihood
thereof. The personal efficacy suppresses such considerations.
4.8. Process 5: Worker Executes the Task
The “Worker executes the task process” model (shown in Figure 9) describes what the workers do
after they commit to do a risky task.
The first situation is that workers refuse to do the task. This is because the detriments are
unacceptable relative to OHS standards and regulations. However, to complete the work, managers
and supervisors may then try to find some new methods in order to reduce the risk. This may result in
effectively returning to Process 1, i.e., the start of the model.
Another situation is that workers accept to do the task and they are willing to be exposed to the
residual hazards. In this situation, workers may use safe procedures or engage in short cuts, depending
on their decisions earlier in the process (see Process 3).
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4.9. Process 6: OHS Outcome
The final OHS outcome model illustrates the process from harm occurrence to recovery,
see Figure 10. Here, we are particularly interested in representing the chronic harm condition, and its
relationship to the assumption of risk, perverse agency, and misapplied creativity of the previous stages.
Two pathways are used to address the different situations when harm occurs to the human body.
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The first situation is that natural recovery takes place, and the person recovers full functionality.
The worker may not even feel the effects of the injury if the recovery process is faster than the damage
inducing mechanisms. The ability for the human body to heal is dependent on age; thus, a degree of
risk-taking may be more tolerable for younger than older people.
The second, and more general, situation is that the harm accumulates, often without initial
detection. The harm may occur by cumulative exposure (e.g., to noise or chemical compounds),
or have a period of latency before symptoms develop (e.g., carcinoma). Subsequently, some time later,
people detect their health problem, thus chronic harm/injuries arise. Frustratingly, for prevention
efforts, the long latency often means that (a) enduring harm is already done and it is too late to
apply prevention or to desist from performing the tasks, and (b) it is not always possible to explicitly
identify the original injury mechanism, offending task, or place of work. The latter has the further
consequence that the industry does not get timely feedback that certain tasks are unreasonably harmful,
i.e., the continuous improvement loop is not closed, and furthermore, the person may not qualify for
workers’ compensation or free healthcare.
Examples of these chronic injuries include musculoskeletal disease, loss of hearing, and persistent
pain. People with chronic injuries may or may not have access to medical treatment, depending on their
personal financial situation and the extent of public medical coverage. Chronic injuries tend to reduce
peoples’ ability to work, and hence reduce income. With time, some people recover functionality,
some only partially, and others not at all. At the same time, people are getting older, and natural
regenerative healing mechanisms are slower, and other age-related health issues arise to complicate
the situation.
Chronic injuries can be seriously debilitating in developing countries, the poor, and the elderly.
Furthermore, chronic injury can contribute to anxiety and psychological poor health [109]. People who
suffer a chronic injury may have a significant decrease in their quality of life (QOL). There are
instruments to measure this loss [110].
Those who do recover and are young enough to still be in employment may find themselves
exposed to the same health and safety hazards again. Ideally, their experience of poor health may
cause them to be more attentive to their work practices. This is illustrated by the feedback loop in
Figure 2. We expect that many workers, especially those who are young and have not experienced
medical incidents of any kind, are unable to predict the health consequences of their perverse agency.
They do not feel any immediate harm from performing the task, and they are unable to anticipate how
it may affect them when they are older. They may even be emboldened to perform risky tasks for the
sake of gaining social esteem within the work group. They do not necessarily learn vicariously from
seeing how chronic injuries adversely affect the quality of life of older people. Sometimes, those older
people are not even in the workplace any longer, so that there is no obvious connection between the
present task and the chronic injuries.
5. Discussion
5.1. Summary
In summary, this Risk, Agency, and Safety & Health (RASH) model proposes that people
willingly expose themselves to chronic injuries via a series of risk-taking processes. This causal
chain starts with personal motivation and over-alignment with organisational purpose (including
impression management). Ideally, motivation would be moderated by an ability to predict future harm
consequences from the task at hand, but that mechanism is weak because it is difficult to predict cause
and effect, the consequences are too far in the future, and opportunities for vicarious learning are few.
The motivation then causes misdirected creativity, hence the development of personally novel ways
of solving the problem, albeit with greater risk of harm. Perverse agency then sustains actions that
exposure the person to harm.
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5.2. Original Contributions
This work makes several novel contributions. Firstly, it offers a finer-resolution explanation
of risk-taking activities in the organizational context. It explains the causality whereby people
compromise their personal occupational health and safety. It does this by combining new and old
concepts. It incorporates several well-established elements of psychology, namely motivation theory,
personality, worldviews, self-efficacy, locus of control, dark triad, and ethics. It also uses the concept
of organisational alignment, which is from strategic human resource management (SHRM) and
organizational behavior (OB) more generally. Therefore, a second contribution is that these multiple
disparate concepts have been integrated into a holistic model.
Several of the specific elements in this model are believed to be original. These include the
proposed relationship between novelty and the risk perceived in a task (see the 2 × 2 matrix of
Figures 3 and 4). Also, the concept of perverse agency has not previously been identified, although the
agency of itself is a long-standing concept.
Existing models of harm causation include the following.
Domino theory [111]—This was developed by H.W. Heinrich in 1931 and proposed that accident
happens in a sequence like dominoes knocking each other. He also described the cause factors to be
social environment and ancestry, fault of the person, and unsafe acts [112]. In contrast, the RASH
model focuses more on workers’ motivation and decision making. Additionally, RASH includes more
factors (especially elements from psychology). Moreover, our model has a specific focus on long term
health consequences.
Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model [113]—James Reason developed a dynamic model to describe the
relationship between human factor errors and safety accidents [114,115]. The model provides a general
categorization of human errors into slips, lapses, mistakes, and violations. This has been useful and
further developed and applied into the crew resource management (CRM) framework e.g., [70], and the
barrier or the bowtie method [116–119]. The limitation of the Swiss Chess model and its derivatives
is the inability to explain why the human factors occur in the first place. Additionally, this class of
models describes the cause of accidents as a linear sequence of events. In contrast, the RASH model
offers a more detailed explanation of the psychology that underlies the human factors. It also explicitly
includes the cumulative exposure and long-term health issues, whereas those other methods tend to
focus on accident causation.
In summary, when compared to existing models, the RASH model has the following features.
Firstly, it includes more sub-components, especially elements from psychology. Secondly, it provides
an integrative treatment in the way that it relates these factors together. Thirdly, it is particularly
strong at describing the cognitive processes that contribute to the decisions made before the accident
commences—in contrast, many other models focus on the physical sequence of the accident. Fourthly,
it specifically includes the long-term harm effects. Fifthly, the RASH model focuses on how
people make risky decisions, this is a generally decision-making focus, not a specific focus on one
particular situation.
5.3. Implications for Practitioners
The model is particularly focused on the health and chronic harm component of H&S, as opposed
to the accident or safety part. This is deliberate, because the chronic harm part is underrepresented
in the safety literature as compared to the safety part. It is much easier in industry to address the
safety part, because the consequences of an accident are immediately apparent. Many of the safety
systems are built on that assumption of immediacy, e.g., accident and near-miss reporting systems.
Consequently, the continuous improvement processes work quickly and effectively for safety, but only
weakly for long-term harm. This work makes a contribution by proposing a set of mental processes
in the mind of the worker at the moment of time before the harm occurs. By framing these in terms
of standard psychological constructs (many of which have their own measurement instruments) it is
hoped that future work may lead to a situation where workers can be trained to put aside these
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perverse antecedents and thereby avoid chronic harm. Obviously, we have not achieved that level
of intervention, but it is hoped that the model moves the field forward by providing a candidate
framework for how the incidence of chronic harm may be reduced.
Our tentative recommendations to employers would be to take more care about presenting
organisational alignment in a balanced way. Most chief executive officers (CEOs) are motivated,
intrinsically or by performance incentives, in order to maximise worker motivation towards the
organisational purpose, hence alignment. A number of SHRM tools are available to achieve this. It is
rare to see the OB literature acknowledge the possibility of over-alignment and identify the specific
detriments thereof. Unethical behavior is known to be one such adverse outcome, and now we propose
that long-term harm is another. If this is true, then it implies the necessity to use the SHRM tools in
a more balanced way, so as not to recruit perverse agency. Thus, it is our belief that the problem of
perverse agency, while occurring within the cognition of the worker, is fundamentally a problem of
the organization and its culture, and consequently, a deficiency of leadership.
Regarding the conventional safety prevention framework of avoidance and minimization,
the implications of the present work would be the following. For avoidance, we suggest that workers
judge their capability more carefully at the decision-making stage before commencing work. We suggest
that they attempt to de-bias themselves from excessive organizational over-alignment—possibly they
might achieve this by considering themselves as professional operators who (a) are technical experts
about the task and (b) intend to live a long life with high quality of life. For minimization, we suggest
achieving this aim by (a) team support and (b) safety training. Team support refers to building
a support system between teammates, e.g., tool-box talks [120]. This is not solved by recruiting a new
safety team, but building a positive safety culture.
5.4. Limitations of the Work
The work is conceptual in nature, and the proposed causality is thus speculative. We have
designed the model to improve the robustness, by including extant concepts from psychology where
possible. However, this does not guarantee that the model is correct.
Another limitation is that we have designed the model from a pejorative perspective, i.e., of the
worker who is taking a safety short cut. There are many other workers who do not behave in this way,
and the model does not represent their actions.
5.5. Implications for Further Research
This work provides a broad framework within which are numerous implied relationships of
causality. Future work could be directed to verify whether the sub processes do actually work as
depicted, and what the conditional factors (contingency variables) might be. An interesting and useful
feature of the flowchart model is that each activity block can be interrogated in this way. For example,
in Figure 5, it is proposed that intrinsic motivation is some combination of several factors (personality,
worldview, valance, expectancy, etc.). How strong are these individual contributions? This might be
explored by seeking the correlation coefficients in a quantitative statistical study. Similarly, there are
opportunities for qualitative research in the sub models, for example, to determine how workers make
sense of their alignment with the organizational objectives.
6. Conclusions
This paper developed a conceptual model for why workers expose themselves to health risks.
It is proposed that harm arises from personal motivation and over-alignment with organisational
purpose, which recruit misdirected creativity and perverse agency. Original contributions are the
provision of a detailed explanation for risk-taking, and the integration of multiple well-established
psychological constructs.
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